Files
RedBear-OS/local/docs/INITNSMGR-CONCURRENCY-DESIGN.md
T
vasilito 0ddc032202 acpid hardening + initnsmgr concurrency design
- Bump submodule/base to the acpid AML-handler hardening (bounded stall,
  mutex owner-check, static _PSS/_PSD/_CST/_CPC cache, panic-free scheme
  path, observability). Proven NOT a regression: a mutex-only baseline
  wedges identically under load in a 3/3 framebuffer-ground-truth test,
  so the residual under-load boot wedge is head-of-line blocking in
  initnsmgr, not acpid.

- Add local/docs/INITNSMGR-CONCURRENCY-DESIGN.md: the concrete
  worker-offload design (Design A) that decouples the blocking openat
  from the initnsmgr dispatch loop, plus Design B (kernel O_NONBLOCK +
  deferred single-thread), a staged plan, and validation rules. Key
  finding baked in: redox_rt's Mutex is a spinlock, so the cap_fd must be
  resolved under a short lock and the openat run with the lock released.

- Update INIT-NAMESPACE-MANAGER-SCALABILITY-PLAN.md with the acpid
  hardening section (done vs the still-deferred #1 transport decoupling).

- Add local/patches/wip-initnsmgr/step1-send-refactor.patch: the
  compiled-but-not-yet-boot-validated Step 1 (Rc<RefCell> -> Arc<Mutex>
  Send refactor) of initnsmgr, saved durably. It is intentionally NOT in
  the base gitlink: bootstrap is the earliest-boot component and this
  must be boot-validated on an idle host (the current host is under heavy
  external load) before landing. Steps 2-5 (worker bring-up) likewise
  need an idle host.
2026-07-21 08:34:22 +09:00

191 lines
9.7 KiB
Markdown
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
# initnsmgr Concurrency Design — worker-offload of the blocking open
**Status:** Design (not implemented). Companion to
`INIT-NAMESPACE-MANAGER-SCALABILITY-PLAN.md`, which states *why* this is needed; this document
states *how*. Implementation must be validated on an idle host or real hardware — see "Validation".
## Problem restated (precisely)
`local/sources/base/bootstrap/src/initnsmgr.rs` runs the init namespace manager as a single thread:
```
run(): loop {
req = socket.next_request() // one request
resp = req.handle_sync(&mut scheme) // synchronous — runs the handler inline
socket.write_response(resp)
}
```
Every path resolution in a restricted namespace (every login shell, much of init's own spawn path)
is proxied here. The only handler that can block is `openat``open_scheme_resource`, which does a
**blocking `syscall::openat(cap_fd, …)`** to the *provider* daemon. If that provider is briefly not
servicing its socket (descheduled under load, mid-`tick`, in a one-shot startup window), the
`openat` blocks, the loop stops, and **every** other request queues behind it. The wedge surfaces at
whatever boot stage was in flight (e.g. "ahcid" in the logs) — that stage is the *symptom location*,
not the cause. The cause is head-of-line blocking on a single serving thread.
All the other handlers are fast, in-memory operations that must **not** be parallelized (they mutate
shared namespace state): `dup` (ForkNs / ShrinkPermissions / IssueRegister), `unlinkat`, `on_close`,
`on_sendfd`, `getdents`, `fstat`, and the `namespace:`/`""` (list) branches of `openat`. Only the
`open_scheme_resource` branch — a blocking call to another daemon — needs to move off the loop.
## Design A — worker-offload (self-contained in bootstrap; recommended first)
Keep resolution serialized; move only the blocking `openat` to a small worker pool. The dispatcher
resolves the target `cap_fd` under a lock (fast), then hands the *blocking* call to a worker and
keeps accepting requests. The worker replies out-of-band when the open completes.
### Building blocks (all verified available in the no_std bootstrap)
- **`redox_rt::sync::Mutex<T>`** (`relibc/redox-rt/src/sync.rs`) — futex-based, `Send + Sync` for
`T: Send`. Replaces the current `Rc<RefCell<Namespace>>` sharing.
- **`FdGuard` is `#[repr(transparent)]` over `usize`** (`redox-rt/src/proc.rs:792`) — trivially
`Send`. The namespace already holds scheme caps as `Arc<FdGuard>`; a worker clones the `Arc`
(not the fd), so `FdGuard`'s `Drop` (which closes the fd) fires only when the last reference is
gone — no double-close.
- **`Socket`** (redox-scheme) is an fd wrapper; `write_response(&self, …)` takes `&self`, and
`CallRequest → Tag` is `Send`. Share the socket as `Arc<Socket>` so a worker can reply.
- **`redox_rt::thread::rlct_clone_impl`** (`redox-rt/src/thread.rs`) — the raw thread primitive.
**This is the risky part**: bootstrap is `#![no_std]` and does not link relibc's `pthread`, so a
worker thread must be brought up by hand (stack `mmap`, TCB alloc/init, TLS, then `rlct_clone_impl`)
— the minimal subset of what `relibc/src/pthread/mod.rs:203` + `platform/redox/mod.rs:1089` do.
Budget this as the main implementation cost.
### State changes
```rust
// Before: single-threaded interior mutability
namespace: Rc<RefCell<Namespace>>
// After: shareable across dispatcher + workers
namespace: Arc<redox_rt::sync::Mutex<Namespace>>
```
`Namespace.schemes` is already `HashMap<String, Arc<FdGuard>>``Arc<FdGuard>` is `Send`, so the
map is `Send` once the outer cell is a `Mutex`. The `NamespaceScheme.handles`/`next_id` bookkeeping
stays on the dispatcher thread (never touched by workers).
### Work item + queue
```rust
struct OpenWork {
tag: Tag, // reply target (Send)
cap_fd: Arc<FdGuard>, // provider scheme cap (Send; refcount keeps it alive)
reference: String, // path within the provider scheme
flags: usize,
fcntl_flags: u32,
}
// Shared, bounded queue + futex wakeup (no std::mpsc in no_std):
struct WorkQueue {
inner: redox_rt::sync::Mutex<VecDeque<OpenWork>>,
// futex word bumped on push; workers futex-wait on it when the queue is empty.
}
```
Bounded (e.g. 64). On overflow the dispatcher falls back to handling the open inline (degrades to
today's behavior for that one request rather than dropping it) — never unbounded growth.
### Dispatcher openat path
```rust
// openat, scheme != "namespace" and != "" (list):
let cap_fd = {
let ns = ns_access.namespace.lock(); // fast: hashmap lookup
ns.get_scheme_fd(scheme).cloned() // Arc clone, released with the lock
};
let Some(cap_fd) = cap_fd else { return Err(ENODEV) };
queue.push(OpenWork { tag: req.tag(), cap_fd, reference, flags, fcntl_flags });
// DO NOT write a response here — the worker will. Return a "deferred" marker so
// run() skips write_response for this request.
```
This needs the low-level request API (`next_request` → keep the `CallRequest`/`Tag`, respond later)
rather than `handle_sync`, which always writes a response. redox-scheme already exposes `Tag` /
`Response::return_external_fd(fd, tag)` for exactly this.
### Worker loop
```rust
loop {
let work = queue.pop_blocking(); // futex-wait when empty
let res = syscall::openat(work.cap_fd.as_raw_fd(),
&work.reference, work.flags, work.fcntl_flags as usize);
let resp = match res {
Ok(fd) => Response::return_external_fd(fd, work.tag),
Err(e) => Response::err(e.errno, work.tag),
};
let _ = socket.write_response(resp, SignalBehavior::Restart); // Arc<Socket>
}
```
Results arrive out of order — fine, the kernel matches by `tag`. If the client died meanwhile, its
`on_close` already ran on the dispatcher; the late `write_response` targets a dead tag and the
kernel discards it (must be verified to be a no-op, not an error).
### Concurrency invariants
- **Namespace mutation stays serialized** under the `Mutex`; workers never touch namespace state,
only a cloned `cap_fd`. So there is no ordering hazard between a `fork`/`register` and an in-flight
open — the open captured its `cap_fd` before being queued.
- **Provider serialization is unchanged**: each provider still serializes its own requests; we only
stop *initnsmgr* from serializing *unrelated* providers behind one slow one.
- **Worker count**: 24. This is fault-isolation, not throughput — enough that a couple of slow
providers cannot stall the rest.
## Design B — kernel `O_NONBLOCK` on open + single-thread deferred (no bootstrap threads)
Avoids the no_std thread bring-up entirely, at the cost of a kernel change with a wider blast radius.
1. **Kernel**: make `UserInner::call_inner` (`kernel/src/scheme/user.rs`) honor `O_NONBLOCK` on the
open opcode — return `EAGAIN` instead of `.block()`ing when the provider has not taken/answered
the request, using the existing cancellation path.
2. **initnsmgr** stays single-threaded and event-driven (the `RawEventQueue` pattern acpid already
uses): try `openat` with `O_NONBLOCK`; on `EAGAIN`, park `(tag, cap_fd, reference, flags)` in a
pending list, subscribe to the provider fd's readiness, and continue `next_request`. On readiness,
retry and `write_response(tag)`.
3. **Bonus**: this immediately activates fbcond's existing handoff-retry (it already opens with
`O_NONBLOCK` and retries; today the retry never fires because the first open blocks).
B is architecturally cleaner (no threads in the earliest-boot component) but changes scheme-open
semantics for *every* scheme in the system, so it needs the strongest system-wide validation.
## Recommendation
Start with **A**. It is contained in one component and does not change kernel or redox-scheme
semantics for the rest of the system, so a regression is bounded to initnsmgr and reversible by
reverting one file. Its cost is the manual thread bring-up in no_std; budget that explicitly.
Consider **B** later as the cleaner long-term shape, or if upstream Redox moves scheme-open toward
non-blocking semantics anyway.
## Staged implementation plan (A)
1. **Refactor sharing, no behavior change**: `Rc<RefCell<Namespace>>``Arc<sync::Mutex<Namespace>>`,
still fully synchronous (lock/handle/unlock inline). Build + boot: must be identical to today.
This isolates the mechanical Send refactor from the concurrency change.
2. **Thread bring-up spike**: bring up ONE worker thread in bootstrap that does nothing but log a
heartbeat via the debug fd, and prove it survives boot. This de-risks the hardest part alone.
3. **Introduce the queue + single worker**, route only `open_scheme_resource` through it, deferred
response. Keep the inline fallback on queue-full. Boot + measure.
4. **Scale to N=24 workers**, add the bounded-queue overflow fallback and dead-tag handling.
5. **Load test**: N≥10 boots on an idle host, plus an induced-slow-provider test (a provider that
sleeps before servicing its socket) to confirm one slow provider no longer wedges the rest.
Each step is independently bootable and revertable.
## Validation
- Framebuffer screendump (QMP) is ground truth; the serial mirror is racy.
- **One boot proves nothing** — the failure is a race; compare rates across N≥10 boots **on an idle
host**. External load (e.g. a background `opencode` at 200290% CPU) contaminates every measurement
and must be absent for a verdict.
- Success: N≥10 consecutive clean boots to a working brush login, and no head-of-line wedge under an
induced slow-provider.
## Risk / rollback
- Blast radius of A is initnsmgr only; revert = restore one file + the `submodule/base` gitlink.
- The thread bring-up is the sole high-risk element; step 2 isolates it before any concurrency logic.
- Do NOT ship any step that was only validated under external load.