Files
RedBear-OS/local/recipes/dev/libclc/source/clang/test/Analysis/taint-generic.cpp
T
vasilito cb424d7448 build: static patch-sanity linter (shift-left the malformed-patch class)
verify-patch-sanity.py validates every active recipe .patch has internally-
consistent hunk line counts — catching the 'malformed patch at line N' failure
at commit/CI/preflight time instead of hours into a cook. This cycle hit that
class three times (qtwaylandscanner, sddm, xwayland), each only discovered when
cookbook tried to apply the patch.

Running it across the repo found 29 latent malformed patches (validated against
GNU patch: e.g. relibc/P3-sysv-ipc reproduces 'malformed patch at line 22').
They were harmless only because they sit in vendored recipes (baked, not re-
applied) — but would fail on any version-bump re-derivation. --fix recounts the
hunk headers (body untouched) and repaired all 29.

Wired into build-preflight.sh (Phase 1.0D) and redbear-ci.yml, with a unit test
(test-patch-sanity.sh). Skips archived/legacy trees and unvalidatable formats
(empty placeholders, bare-@@ git hunks).
2026-08-01 05:13:02 +03:00

206 lines
5.3 KiB
C++

// RUN: %clang_analyze_cc1 -std=c++11 -Wno-format-security \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=core,optin.taint,security.ArrayBound,debug.ExprInspection \
// RUN: -analyzer-config optin.taint.TaintPropagation:Config=%S/Inputs/taint-generic-config.yaml \
// RUN: -verify %s
template <typename T> void clang_analyzer_isTainted(T);
#define BUFSIZE 10
int Buffer[BUFSIZE];
int scanf(const char*, ...);
template <typename T = int> T mySource1();
int mySource3();
typedef struct _FILE FILE;
extern "C" {
extern FILE *stdin;
}
int fscanf(FILE *stream, const char *format, ...);
bool isOutOfRange2(const int*);
void mySink2(int);
// Test configuration
namespace myNamespace {
void scanf(const char*, ...);
void myScanf(const char*, ...);
int mySource3();
bool isOutOfRange(const int*);
bool isOutOfRange2(const int*);
void mySink(int, int, int);
void mySink2(int);
}
namespace myAnotherNamespace {
int mySource3();
bool isOutOfRange2(const int*);
void mySink2(int);
}
void testConfigurationNamespacePropagation1() {
int x;
// The built-in functions should be matched only for functions in
// the global namespace
myNamespace::scanf("%d", &x);
Buffer[x] = 1; // no-warning
scanf("%d", &x);
Buffer[x] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void testConfigurationNamespacePropagation2() {
int x = mySource3();
Buffer[x] = 1; // no-warning
int y = myNamespace::mySource3();
Buffer[y] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void testConfigurationNamespacePropagation3() {
int x = myAnotherNamespace::mySource3();
Buffer[x] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void testConfigurationNamespacePropagation4() {
int x;
// Configured functions without scope should match for all function.
myNamespace::myScanf("%d", &x);
Buffer[x] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void testConfigurationNamespaceFilter1() {
int x = mySource1();
if (myNamespace::isOutOfRange2(&x))
return;
Buffer[x] = 1; // no-warning
int y = mySource1();
if (isOutOfRange2(&y))
return;
Buffer[y] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void testConfigurationNamespaceFilter2() {
int x = mySource1();
if (myAnotherNamespace::isOutOfRange2(&x))
return;
Buffer[x] = 1; // no-warning
}
void testConfigurationNamespaceFilter3() {
int x = mySource1();
if (myNamespace::isOutOfRange(&x))
return;
Buffer[x] = 1; // no-warning
}
void testConfigurationNamespaceSink1() {
int x = mySource1();
mySink2(x); // no-warning
int y = mySource1();
myNamespace::mySink2(y);
// expected-warning@-1 {{Untrusted data is passed to a user-defined sink}}
}
void testConfigurationNamespaceSink2() {
int x = mySource1();
myAnotherNamespace::mySink2(x);
// expected-warning@-1 {{Untrusted data is passed to a user-defined sink}}
}
void testConfigurationNamespaceSink3() {
int x = mySource1();
myNamespace::mySink(x, 0, 1);
// expected-warning@-1 {{Untrusted data is passed to a user-defined sink}}
}
struct Foo {
void scanf(const char*, int*);
void myMemberScanf(const char*, int*);
};
void testConfigurationMemberFunc() {
int x;
Foo foo;
foo.scanf("%d", &x);
Buffer[x] = 1; // no-warning
foo.myMemberScanf("%d", &x);
Buffer[x] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void testReadingFromStdin(char **p) {
int n;
fscanf(stdin, "%d", &n);
Buffer[n] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
namespace gh114270 {
class Empty {};
class Aggr {
public:
int data;
};
void top() {
int Int = mySource1<int>();
clang_analyzer_isTainted(Int); // expected-warning {{YES}}
Empty E = mySource1<Empty>();
clang_analyzer_isTainted(E); // expected-warning {{YES}}
Aggr A = mySource1<Aggr>();
clang_analyzer_isTainted(A); // expected-warning {{YES}}
clang_analyzer_isTainted(A.data); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
} // namespace gh114270
namespace format_attribute {
__attribute__((__format__ (__printf__, 1, 2)))
void log_freefunc(const char *fmt, ...);
void test_format_attribute_freefunc() {
int n;
fscanf(stdin, "%d", &n); // Get a tainted value.
log_freefunc("This number is suspicious: %d\n", n); // no-warning
}
struct Foo {
// When the format attribute is applied to a method, argumet '1' is the
// implicit `this`, so e.g. in this case argument '2' specifies `fmt`.
// Specifying '1' instead of '2' would produce a compilation error:
// "format attribute cannot specify the implicit this argument as the format string"
__attribute__((__format__ (__printf__, 2, 3)))
void log_method(const char *fmt, ...);
void test_format_attribute_method() {
int n;
fscanf(stdin, "%d", &n); // Get a tainted value.
// The analyzer used to misinterpret the parameter indices in the format
// attribute when the format attribute is applied to a method.
log_method("This number is suspicious: %d\n", n); // no-warning
}
__attribute__((__format__ (__printf__, 1, 2)))
static void log_static_method(const char *fmt, ...);
void test_format_attribute_static_method() {
int n;
fscanf(stdin, "%d", &n); // Get a tainted value.
log_static_method("This number is suspicious: %d\n", n); // no-warning
}
};
} // namespace format_attribute