vasilito
cb424d7448
verify-patch-sanity.py validates every active recipe .patch has internally- consistent hunk line counts — catching the 'malformed patch at line N' failure at commit/CI/preflight time instead of hours into a cook. This cycle hit that class three times (qtwaylandscanner, sddm, xwayland), each only discovered when cookbook tried to apply the patch. Running it across the repo found 29 latent malformed patches (validated against GNU patch: e.g. relibc/P3-sysv-ipc reproduces 'malformed patch at line 22'). They were harmless only because they sit in vendored recipes (baked, not re- applied) — but would fail on any version-bump re-derivation. --fix recounts the hunk headers (body untouched) and repaired all 29. Wired into build-preflight.sh (Phase 1.0D) and redbear-ci.yml, with a unit test (test-patch-sanity.sh). Skips archived/legacy trees and unvalidatable formats (empty placeholders, bare-@@ git hunks).
52 lines
2.0 KiB
C
52 lines
2.0 KiB
C
// RUN: %clang_analyze_cc1 -triple i686-unknown-linux -analyzer-checker=security.MmapWriteExec -DUSE_ALTERNATIVE_PROT_EXEC_DEFINITION -verify %s
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// RUN: %clang_analyze_cc1 -triple x86_64-unknown-apple-darwin10 -analyzer-checker=security.MmapWriteExec -verify %s
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#ifndef USE_ALTERNATIVE_PROT_EXEC_DEFINITION
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#define PROT_EXEC 0x01
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#define PROT_WRITE 0x02
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#define PROT_READ 0x04
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#else
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#define PROT_EXEC 0x08
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#define PROT_WRITE 0x04
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#define PROT_READ 0x02
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#endif
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#define MAP_PRIVATE 0x0002
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#define MAP_ANON 0x1000
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#define MAP_FIXED 0x0010
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#define NULL ((void *)0)
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typedef __typeof(sizeof(int)) size_t;
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void *mmap(void *, size_t, int, int, int, long);
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int mprotect(void *, size_t, int);
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void f1(void)
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{
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void *a = mmap(NULL, 16, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0); // no-warning
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void *b = mmap(a, 16, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANON, -1, 0); // no-warning
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void *c = mmap(NULL, 32, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0); // expected-warning{{Both PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC flags are set. This can lead to exploitable memory regions, which could be overwritten with malicious code}}
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(void)a;
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(void)b;
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(void)c;
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}
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void f2(void)
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{
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void *(*callm)(void *, size_t, int, int, int, long);
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callm = mmap;
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int prot = PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC;
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(void)callm(NULL, 1024, prot, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0); // expected-warning{{Both PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC flags are set. This can lead to exploitable memory regions, which could be overwritten with malicious code}}
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}
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void f3(void)
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{
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void *p = mmap(NULL, 1024, PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0); // no-warning
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int m = mprotect(p, 1024, PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC); // expected-warning{{Both PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC flags are set. This can lead to exploitable memory regions, which could be overwritten with malicious code}}
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(void)m;
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}
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// gh62285: no crash on non concrete arg 'prot'
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void *gh62285(void *addr, int prot)
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{
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return mmap(addr, 1, prot, 1, 1, 1);
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}
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