Files
RedBear-OS/local/recipes/dev/libclc/source/clang/test/Analysis/objc-boxing.m
T
vasilito cb424d7448 build: static patch-sanity linter (shift-left the malformed-patch class)
verify-patch-sanity.py validates every active recipe .patch has internally-
consistent hunk line counts — catching the 'malformed patch at line N' failure
at commit/CI/preflight time instead of hours into a cook. This cycle hit that
class three times (qtwaylandscanner, sddm, xwayland), each only discovered when
cookbook tried to apply the patch.

Running it across the repo found 29 latent malformed patches (validated against
GNU patch: e.g. relibc/P3-sysv-ipc reproduces 'malformed patch at line 22').
They were harmless only because they sit in vendored recipes (baked, not re-
applied) — but would fail on any version-bump re-derivation. --fix recounts the
hunk headers (body untouched) and repaired all 29.

Wired into build-preflight.sh (Phase 1.0D) and redbear-ci.yml, with a unit test
(test-patch-sanity.sh). Skips archived/legacy trees and unvalidatable formats
(empty placeholders, bare-@@ git hunks).
2026-08-01 05:13:02 +03:00

93 lines
2.8 KiB
Objective-C

// RUN: %clang_analyze_cc1 -Wno-objc-literal-conversion -analyzer-checker=core,unix.Malloc,osx.cocoa.NonNilReturnValue,debug.ExprInspection -verify %s
void clang_analyzer_eval(int);
typedef signed char BOOL;
typedef long NSInteger;
typedef unsigned long NSUInteger;
@protocol NSObject
@end
@interface NSObject <NSObject> {}
@end
@protocol NSCopying
@end
@protocol NSCoding
@end
@interface NSString @end
@interface NSString (NSStringExtensionMethods)
+ (id)stringWithUTF8String:(const char *)nullTerminatedCString;
@end
@interface NSNumber
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithChar:(char)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithUnsignedChar:(unsigned char)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithShort:(short)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithUnsignedShort:(unsigned short)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithInt:(int)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithUnsignedInt:(unsigned int)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithLong:(long)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithUnsignedLong:(unsigned long)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithLongLong:(long long)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithUnsignedLongLong:(unsigned long long)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithFloat:(float)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithDouble:(double)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithBool:(BOOL)value;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithInteger:(NSInteger)value ;
+ (NSNumber *)numberWithUnsignedInteger:(NSUInteger)value ;
@end
@interface NSValue : NSObject <NSCopying, NSCoding>
- (void)getValue:(void *)value;
+ (NSValue *)valueWithBytes:(const void *)value
objCType:(const char *)type;
@end
typedef typeof(sizeof(int)) size_t;
extern void *malloc(size_t);
extern void free(void *);
extern char *strdup(const char *str);
id constant_string(void) {
return @("boxed constant string.");
}
id dynamic_string(void) {
return @(strdup("boxed dynamic string")); // expected-warning{{Potential memory leak}}
}
typedef struct __attribute__((objc_boxable)) {
const char *str;
} BoxableStruct;
id leak_within_boxed_struct(void) {
BoxableStruct bs;
bs.str = strdup("dynamic string"); // The duped string shall be owned by val.
NSValue *val = @(bs); // no-warning
return val;
}
id leak_of_boxed_struct(void) {
BoxableStruct *bs = malloc(sizeof(BoxableStruct)); // The pointer stored in bs isn't owned by val.
NSValue *val = @(*bs); // expected-warning{{Potential leak of memory pointed to by 'bs'}}
return val;
}
id const_char_pointer(int *x) {
if (x)
return @(3);
return @(*x); // expected-warning {{Dereference of null pointer (loaded from variable 'x')}}
}
void checkNonNil(void) {
clang_analyzer_eval(!!@3); // expected-warning{{TRUE}}
clang_analyzer_eval(!!@(3+4)); // expected-warning{{TRUE}}
clang_analyzer_eval(!!@(57.0)); // expected-warning{{TRUE}}
const char *str = "abc";
clang_analyzer_eval(!!@(str)); // expected-warning{{TRUE}}
clang_analyzer_eval(!!@__objc_yes); // expected-warning{{TRUE}}
}