The capability bitmask patch was missing the critical proc.rs hunk that
derives caps from euid when procmgr writes ProcSchemeAttrs to a child
context. Without this, all child processes had caps=0, causing
EACCES on dup("create-scheme") and crashing boot.
Fix: in ContextHandle::Attr kwrite path, after setting euid/egid/pid/prio,
set guard.caps = CAP_ALL when euid==0, else 0.
P27-capability-bitmask.patch was generated against an incorrectly
patched source tree, causing hunk mismatches in validate-patches.
Regenerated from clean upstream + P0-P26 baseline using git diff -U0 -w.
All 39 patches now validate successfully.
Replace all 9 kernel uid==0 privilege checks with a capability bitmask
model. Adds caps:u64 field to Context and CallerCtx, with CAP_ALL for
root processes. Zero behavioral change - uid==0 still gets all caps.
New module: src/scheme/caps.rs with 10 capability constants.
9 check sites converted: acpi, irq, memory, debug, serio, sys (msr+write),
scheme registration, and fchown.
Patch: local/patches/kernel/P27-capability-bitmask.patch