After commit 589a1044e6 (parent repo) moved
local/docs/INITNSMGR-CONCURRENCY-DESIGN.md to
local/docs/legacy-obsolete-2026-07-25/, the doc reference in
bootstrap/src/initnsmgr.rs became broken. Update it to point at
the archive path so future readers can find the design rationale.
Companion to the LG Gram Round 1 parent-repo commit (same date).
Implement Design B from local/docs/INITNSMGR-CONCURRENCY-DESIGN.md:
initnsmgr now uses O_NONBLOCK on openat to provider daemons and
parks requests when the provider is not ready, instead of
blocking the entire request loop.
Previously: open_scheme_resource did a blocking syscall::openat
to the provider. If the provider was briefly not servicing its
socket (descheduled under load, mid-tick, in a one-shot startup
window), the openat blocked, the loop stopped, and every other
request queued behind it. The wedge surfaced at whatever boot
stage was in flight (e.g. 'ahcid' in the logs) - that stage was
the symptom location, not the cause.
Now:
- openat to a provider is called with O_NONBLOCK.
- On Ok(fd), return the fd immediately.
- On EAGAIN, park the request in a bounded PendingOpens queue
(tag, cap_fd, reference, flags, fcntl_flags).
- On any other error, return the error to the caller (preserves
existing behavior).
- After each next_request cycle, retry ALL parked opens with
O_NONBLOCK. Any that succeed are written back to the original
request via the deferred Response API.
- The park queue is bounded (64 entries). On overflow, the
request falls back to the synchronous path (same as before) -
never unbounded growth.
This implements the traffic-driven retry model: as long as new
requests arrive (e.g. processes starting), parked opens are
re-attempted frequently. When the slow provider finally responds,
all parked opens succeed in the next retry sweep.
The kernel change (commit f5baa05d on submodule/kernel) is the
prerequisite: it implements O_NONBLOCK on OpenAt so the openat
syscall returns EAGAIN when the provider hasn't immediately
answered instead of blocking.
Preserves all existing handlers (dup, unlinkat, on_close,
on_sendfd, getdents, fstat, namespace:/"" branches) unchanged.
Only the openat -> open_scheme_resource path is changed.
Per local/AGENTS.md:
- No new branches (work on submodule/base)
- No stubs, no todo!/unimplemented!
- Cat 2 fork - changes committed to submodule/base branch
Closes v5.3 Design B (base side). Kernel side is the companion
commit on submodule/kernel.
Sync the base fork with 13 upstream commits (xhci event-processing
dedup + IRQ race fix, randd permission simplification, nvmed TimeSpec
fix, /dev/ptmx, fpath legacy-path cleanup, dynamically-linked init
fix, and more). Brings process_one_event into the tree, satisfying the
verify-fork-functions gate for base.
Conflicts resolved (3 of 8 overlapping files; 5 auto-merged):
- drivers/usb/xhcid/src/xhci/irq_reactor.rs: took upstream's
process_one_event/EventProcessResult refactor (b2ed85ea) including
the a01d3ce6 race fix (process events between NoEvent and
unmasking), and re-applied the Red Bear SPURIOUS_REBOOT quirk on the
NoEvent warning (downgrade to debug when quirked).
- randd/src/main.rs: took upstream's permission-handling
simplification (e26db606); re-applied the RB fcntl improvement
(F_GETFL/F_GETFD/F_SETFL/F_SETFD handling, Linux random_fops xref)
and the is_cpu_feature_detected early-return cleanup. Dropped
test_scheme_perms (deleted by upstream's simplification).
- Makefile: kept upstream's new /dev symlink block (dev/null, ptmx,
random, urandom, zero, tty, stdin/stdout/stderr).
Verified: cargo check clean; 57/57 tests pass (xhcid 35, usbhubd 14,
xhci trb 8); verify-fork-functions.sh --no-fetch base reports all
upstream functions present.
Commit bb20fe9c in relibc fork removed FEXEC_STEP diagnostic from
redox_rt::proc. The bootstrap binary in base referenced it in
exec.rs:257, causing build failure:
error[E0425]: cannot find value in module
Removed the diagnostic step variable and simplified the panic message.
Build now compiles cleanly.
Socket and RawEventQueue create fds via libredox raw syscalls that
bypass the redox-rt userspace FILETABLE. FdGuard::dup then reserves
these positions, causing SYS_DUP_INTO to destroy the existing fds.
- on_sendfd: subscribe/dup errors return error Response instead of panic
- fork/new_thread: subscribe errors propagate via ? operator
- signal delivery (4 sites): status fd write errors are best-effort (let _ =)
The procmgr is the first userspace process manager — a panic here kills
the entire system. These changes make it resilient to transient fd errors.
Per local/docs/PATCH-PRESERVATION-AUDIT-2026-07-12.md the base
fork was carrying only 38 of 100 patches in local/patches/base/.
The other 62 patches' content was silently missing from the fork
working tree, even though their .patch files were preserved.
This commit re-applies 41 patches that genuinely still apply
cleanly + 17 hunks that partially applied. Recovery covers:
- D-Bus initfs service wiring (P4-initfs-dbus-services)
- USB service wiring (P4-initfs-usb-drm-services)
- netcfg/dhcp/dhcpv6 driver fixes
- acpid shutdown/PM/quirk fixes
- inputd/ps2d hard-fail logging
- pcid driver interface refinements (server cmd channel)
- virtio-core for VirtualBox support
- ixgbed/rtl8139/rtl8168 net drivers
- ahcid NCQ + per-function interrupt coalescing
- logd persistent logging
- bootstrap procmgr race-condition fixes
- cargo version pin to +rb0.3.0 (synchronized release branch)
58 files changed, +1444/-318 lines.
Untracked mnt/ tree and *.orig / *.rej files cleaned up after
patch application (leftover from absolute-path patch headers).
Our Red Bear patches had reverted the userspace fd allocation refactor
(commit 372b200f) in exec.rs. This caused FD tracking mismatches
between the userspace FILETABLE and the kernel fd table, resulting in
EEXIST errors and fork failures.
Restored the upstream version which correctly uses redox_rt::sys::*
functions (openat, dup, sys_call_ro) that go through the FILETABLE,
and openat_into_upper for pre-init FD allocation. Also includes the
filetable_binary_fd setup and same_process flag in ExtraInfo.
The bootstrap's start.rs used libredox::call::openat which resolved to
the bootstrap's own redox_openat_v1 in initfs.rs, calling syscall::openat
(SYS_OPENAT). This let the kernel allocate POSIX FDs 0,1,2 for
stdin/stdout/stderr, but the userspace FILETABLE was never updated.
Later, exec.rs called auth.dup(b'cur-context') via redox_rt::sys::dup,
which asked the empty FILETABLE for a free slot (returning 0), then
passed it to SYS_DUP_INTO. The kernel rejected it with EEXIST because
posix_fdtbl[0] was already occupied by stdin.
Fix: use syscall::openat_into to directly specify FD slots 0,1,2 in
start.rs, and use syscall::dup_into with a computed FD index for
cur-context in exec.rs. Both bypass the FILETABLE, which is only
populated later by redox_rt::initialize_freestanding.
This can be done using rmdir /scheme/my_scheme. Scheme implementations
do not yet exit when all fds are closed, but you can now kill the
service and restart it after you removed its scheme.
This sets PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH and runs init scripts for the new root.
In the future this could replace the entire set of services that should
run, restarting any services for which a newer executable is available
in the new root and stopping any services which don't exist in the new
root. This behavior could also be useful for soft-reboots in the future
to handle updates without rebooting the entire system.
Red Bear OS